Computational Models of Episodic Memory

Kenneth A. Norman, Greg Detre, & Sean M. Polyn

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1. Introduction

The term *episodic memory* refers to our ability to recall previously experienced events, and to recognize things as having been encountered previously. Over the past several decades, research on the neural basis of episodic memory has increasingly come to focus on three structures:

- The hippocampus supports recall of specific details from previously experienced events (for neuroimaging evidence, see, e.g., Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Ranganath, Yonelinas, Cohen, Dy, Tom, & D’Esposito, 2003; Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000; Dobbins, Rice, Wagner, & Schacter, 2003; for a review of relevant lesion data, see Aggleton & Brown, 1999).

- Perirhinal cortex computes a scalar *familiarity signal* that discriminates between studied and nonstudied items (for neuroimaging evidence, see, e.g., Gonsalves, Kahn, Curran, Norman, & Wagner, 2005; Henson, Cansino, Herron, Robb, & Rugg, 2003; Brozinsky, Yonelinas, Kroll, & Ranganath, 2005; for neurophysiological evidence, see, e.g., Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993; Xiang & Brown, 1998; for evidence that perirhinal cortex can support near-normal levels of familiarity-based recognition on its own, after focal hippocampal damage, see, e.g., Yonelinas, Kroll, Quamme, Lazzara, Sauve, Widaman, & Knight, 2002; Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004; but see, e.g., Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003 for an opposing viewpoint).

- Prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in *memory targeting*: In situations where the bottom-up retrieval cue is not sufficiently specific to trigger activation of memory traces in the medial temporal lobe, prefrontal cortex acts to flesh out the retrieval cue, by actively maintaining additional information that specifies the to-be-retrieved episode (for reviews of how prefrontal cortex contributes to episodic memory, see Simons & Spiers, 2003; Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Shimamura, 1994; Schacter, 1987).
While there is general agreement about the roles of the three structures mentioned above, there is less agreement about how (mechanistically) these structures enact the roles specified above. This chapter reviews two kinds of models: biologically-based models that are meant to address how the neural structures mentioned above contribute to recognition and recall; and abstract models that try to describe the mental algorithms that support recognition and recall judgments, without specifically addressing how these algorithms might be implemented in the brain.

**Weight-based vs. activation-based memory mechanisms**

Within the realm of biologically-based episodic memory models, one can make a distinction between *weight-based* and *activation-based* memory mechanisms (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000). Weight-based memory mechanisms support recognition and recall by making lasting changes to synaptic weights at study. Activation-based memory mechanisms support recognition and recall of an item by actively maintaining the pattern of neural activity elicited by the item during the study phase. Activation-based memory mechanisms can support recognition and recall after short delays. However, our ability to recognize and recall stimuli after longer delays depends on changes to synaptic weights. This chapter primarily focuses on weight-based memory mechanisms, although *Section 4* discusses interactions between weight-based and activation-based memory mechanisms.

**Outline**

*Section 2* of the chapter provides an overview of biological models of episodic memory, with a special focus on the Complementary Learning Systems model (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). *Section 3* reviews abstract models of episodic memory. *Section 4* discusses how both abstract and biological models have been extended to address *temporal context memory*: our ability to focus retrieval on a particular time period, to the exclusion of others. This section starts by describing the abstract Temporal Context Model (TCM) developed by Howard and Kahana (2002). The remainder of *Section 4* discusses how temporal context
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memory can be instantiated in neural systems.

2. Biologically-based models of episodic memory

The first part of this section reviews the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) model (McClelland et al., 1995) and how it has been applied to understanding hippocampal and neocortical contributions to episodic memory (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). Section 2.2 discusses some alternative views of how neocortex contributes to episodic memory.

2.1. The Complementary Learning Systems model

The CLS model incorporates several widely-held ideas about the division of labor between hippocampus and neocortex that have been developed over many years by many different researchers (e.g., Scoville & Milner, 1957; Marr, 1971; Grossberg, 1976; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Teylor & Discenna, 1986; McNaughton & Morris, 1987; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Rolls, 1989; Sutherland & Rudy, 1989; Squire, 1992; Eichenbaum, Otto, & Cohen, 1994; Treves & Rolls, 1994; Burgess & O’Keefe, 1996; Wu, Baxter, & Levy, 1996; Moll & Miikkulainen, 1997; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Yonelinas, 2002; Becker, 2005). According to the CLS model, neocortex forms the substrate of our internal model of the structure of the environment. In contrast, hippocampus is specialized for rapidly and automatically memorizing patterns of cortical activity, so they can be recalled later (based on partial cues). The model posits that neocortex learns incrementally; each training trial results in relatively small adaptive changes in synaptic weights. These small changes allow cortex to gradually adjust its internal model of the environment in response to new information. The other key property of neocortex (according to the model) is that it assigns similar (overlapping) representations to similar stimuli. Use of overlapping representations allows cortex to represent the shared structure of events, and therefore makes it possible for cortex to generalize to novel stimuli based on their similarity to previously experienced stimuli.
In contrast, the model posits that hippocampus assigns distinct, *pattern separated* representations to stimuli, regardless of their similarity. This property allows hippocampus to rapidly memorize arbitrary patterns of cortical activity without suffering unacceptably high (catastrophic) levels of interference.

**Applying CLS to episodic memory**

CLS was originally formulated as a set of high-level principles for understanding hippocampal and cortical contributions to memory. More recently, Norman and O’Reilly (2003) implemented hippocampal and cortical networks that adhere to CLS principles, and used the models to simulate episodic memory data. Learning was implemented in these simulations using a simple Hebbian rule, called *instar learning* by Grossberg (1976) and *Conditional Principal Components Analysis (CPCA) Hebbian learning* by O’Reilly and Munakata (2000):

\[ \Delta w_{ij} = \epsilon y_j (x_i - w_{ij}) \]  

(1)

In this equation, \( x_i \) is the activation of sending unit \( i \), \( y_j \) is the activation of receiving unit \( j \), \( w_{ij} \) is the strength of the connection between \( i \) and \( j \), and \( \epsilon \) is the learning rate parameter. This rule has the effect of strengthening connections between active sending and receiving neurons, and weakening connections between active receiving neurons and inactive sending neurons.

In both the hippocampal and cortical networks, to-be-memorized items are represented by patterns of excitatory activity that are distributed across multiple units (simulated neurons) in the network. Excitatory activity spreads from unit to unit via positive-valued synaptic weights. The overall level of excitatory activity in the network is controlled by a *feedback inhibition* mechanism that samples the amount of excitatory activity in a particular subregion of the model, and sends back a proportional amount of inhibition (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000).

The CLS model instantiates the idea (mentioned in the *Introduction*) that hippocampus contributes to recognition memory by *recalling* specific studied details, and that cortex contributes
Figure 1: Diagram of the CLS hippocampal network. The hippocampal network links input patterns in entorhinal cortex (EC) to relatively non-overlapping (pattern-separated) sets of units in region CA3. The dentate gyrus (DG) serves to facilitate pattern separation in region CA3. Recurrent connections in CA3 bind together all of the units involved in representing a particular EC pattern; the CA3 representation is linked back to EC via region CA1. Learning in the CA3 recurrent connections, and in projections linking EC to CA3 and CA3 to CA1, makes it possible to recall entire stored EC patterns based on partial cues.

to recognition by computing a scalar *familiarity* signal. In this respect, the CLS model belongs to a long tradition of *dual-process* theories of recognition memory that posit conjoint contributions of recall and familiarity to recognition performance (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review of dual-process theories). The next two sections provide an overview of the CLS hippocampal and cortical networks, and how they have been applied to episodic memory data. For additional details regarding the CLS model (equations and key model parameters) see Appendix A; also, a working, documented version of the CLS model can be downloaded from http://compmem.princeton.edu/.

**CLS model of hippocampal recall**

The job of the CLS hippocampal model is to memorize patterns of activity in entorhinal cortex (*EC*), the neocortical region that serves as an interface between hippocampus and the rest of neocortex, so these patterns can be retrieved later in response to partial cues. The architecture of the model (illustrated in Figure 1) reflects a broad consensus regarding key anatomical and physio-
logical characteristics of different hippocampal subregions (Squire, Shimamura, & Amaral, 1989), and how these subregions contribute to the overall goal of memorizing cortical patterns. While the fine-grained details of other hippocampal models may differ slightly from the CLS model, the “big picture” story (reviewed below) is remarkably consistent across models (Rolls, 1989; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Meeter, Murre, & Talamini, 2004; Becker, 2005).

In the brain, EC is split into two layers, a superficial layer that primarily sends input into the hippocampus, and a deep layer that primarily receives output from the hippocampus (Witter, Wouterlood, Naber, & Van Haeften, 2000); in the model, these layers are referred to as EC_in and EC_out. The part of the model corresponding to the hippocampus proper is subdivided into different layers, corresponding to different anatomical subregions of the hippocampus. At encoding, the hippocampal model binds together sets of co-occurring neocortical features (corresponding to a particular episode) by linking co-active units in EC_in to a cluster of units in region CA3. These CA3 units serve as the hippocampal representation of the episode. In addition to strengthening feedforward connections between EC_in and CA3, recurrent connections between active CA3 units are also strengthened. To allow for recall, active CA3 units are linked back to the original pattern of cortical activity via region CA1. Like CA3, region CA1 also contains a representation of the input pattern. However, unlike the CA3 representation, the CA1 representation is invertible — if an item’s representation is activated in CA1, well-established connections between CA1 and EC_out allow activity to spread back to the item’s representation in EC_out. Thus, CA1 serves to translate between sparse representations in CA3 and more overlapping representations in EC (for more discussion of this issue, see McClelland & Goddard, 1996 and O’Reilly, Norman, & McClelland, 1998).

The projections described above are updated using the CPCA Hebbian learning rule during the study phase of the experiment (except for connections between EC and CA1, which are pre-trained to form an invertible mapping). At test, when a partial version of a stored EC pattern is presented to the hippocampal model, the model is capable of reactivating the entire CA3 pattern corresponding
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to that item because of learning (in feedforward and recurrent connections) that occurred at study. Activation then spreads from the item’s CA3 representation back to the item’s EC representation (via CA1). In this manner, the hippocampal model manages to retrieve a complete version of the EC pattern in response to a partial cue. This process is typically referred to as pattern completion.

To minimize interference between episodes, the hippocampal model has a built-in bias to assign relatively non-overlapping (pattern separated) CA3 representations to different episodes. Pattern separation occurs because of strong feedback inhibition in CA3, which leads to sparse representations: In the hippocampal model, only the top 4% of units in CA3 (ranked in terms of excitatory input) are active for any given input pattern. The fact that CA3 units are hard to activate reduces the odds that a given unit will be active for any two input patterns, thereby leading to pattern separation.

Pattern separation in CA3 is greatly facilitated by the dentate gyrus (DG). Like CA3, the DG also receives a projection from EC_in. The DG has even sparser representations than CA3, and has a very strong projection to CA3 (the mossy fiber pathway). In effect, the DG can be viewed as selecting a (nearly) unique representation for each stimulus, and then forcing that representation onto CA3 via the mossy fiber pathways (see O’Reilly & McClelland, 1994 for a much more detailed treatment of pattern separation in the hippocampus, and the role of the dentate gyrus in facilitating pattern separation). Recently, Becker (2005) has argued that neurogenesis in DG plays a key role in fostering pattern separation: Inserting new neurons and connections into DG ensures that, if two similar patterns that are fed into DG on different occasions, they will elicit distinct patterns of DG activity (because the DG connectivity matrix is different on the first vs. second occasion).

To apply the hippocampal model to recognition, Norman and O’Reilly (2003) compared the test cue (presented on the EC_in layer) to the pattern of retrieved information (activated over the EC_out layer). When recalled information matches the test cue, this constitutes evidence that the item was studied; conversely, mismatch between recalled information and the test cue constitutes
evidence that the test cue was not studied (e.g., study “rats”; test “rat”; if the hippocampal model recalls that “rats”-plural was studied, not “rat”-singular, this can serve as grounds for rejection of “rat”).

*Optimizing the dynamics of the hippocampal model*  As discussed by O’Reilly and McClelland (1994), the greatest computational challenge faced by the hippocampal model is dealing with the inherent trade-off between pattern separation and pattern completion. Pattern separation reduces the extent to which storing a new memory trace damages other, previously stored memory traces. However, this tendency to assign distinct hippocampal representations to similar EC inputs can interfere with pattern completion at retrieval: It is very uncommon for retrieval cues to *exactly* match stored patterns; if there is a mismatch between the retrieval cue and the to-be-recalled trace, pattern separation mechanisms might cause the cue to activate a different set of CA3 units than the original memory trace (so retrieval will not occur). Hasselmo and colleagues (e.g., Hasselmo, 1995; Hasselmo, Wyble, & Wallenstein, 1996; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997) have also pointed out that pattern completion can interfere with pattern separation: If, during storage of a new memory, the hippocampus recalls related memories, such that both old and new memories are simultaneously active at encoding, these memories will become even more tightly associated (due to Hebbian learning between co-active neurons) and thus run the risk of blending together.

To counteract these problems, Hasselmo and others have argued that the hippocampus has an *encoding mode*, where the functional connectivity of the hippocampus is optimized for storage of new memories, and a *retrieval mode*, where the functional connectivity of the hippocampus is optimized for retrieval of stored memory traces that match the current input.

Two of the most prominent optimizations discussed by Hasselmo are:

- The strength of CA3 recurrants should be larger during retrieval mode than encoding mode.
  Increasing the strength of recurrent connections facilitates pattern completion.

- During encoding mode, the primary influence on CA1 activity should be the current input
pattern in EC. During retrieval mode, the primary influence on CA1 activity should be the retrieved (“completed”) pattern in CA3.

For discussion of these optimizations as well as others (relating to adjustments in hippocampal learning rates) see Hasselmo et al. (1996).  

Hasselmo originally proposed that mode-setting was accomplished by varying the concentration of the neuromodulatory chemical acetylcholine (ACh). Hasselmo and Wyble (1997) present a computational model of this process. According to this model, presenting a novel pattern to the hippocampus activates the basal forebrain, which (in turn) releases ACh into the hippocampus, triggering encoding mode (see Meeter et al., 2004 for a similar model). For physiological evidence that ACh triggers the key properties of encoding mode (as listed above), see Hasselmo, Schnell, and Barkai (1995) and Hasselmo and Schnell (1994).

More recently, Hasselmo and Fehlau (2001) have argued that ACh can not be the only mechanism of mode-setting in the hippocampus, because the temporal dynamics of ACh release are too slow (on the order of seconds) — by the time that ACh is released, the to-be-encoded stimulus may already be gone. Hasselmo and Fehlau (2001) argue that, in order to support more responsive mode-setting, the ACh-based mechanism discussed above is supplemented by another mechanism that leverages hippocampal theta oscillations (rhythmic changes in the local field potential, at approximately 4-8 Hz in humans). Specifically, they argue that oscillatory changes in the concentration of the neurotransmitter GABA cause the hippocampus to flip back and forth between encoding and retrieval modes several times per second — as such, each stimulus is processed (several times) both as a new stimulus to be encoded, and as a “reminder” to retrieve other stimuli. Hasselmo, Bodelon, and Wyble (2002) present a detailed computational model of this theta-based mode setting; for physiological evidence in support of this model see Wyble, Linster,  

1Yet another optimization, not discussed by Hasselmo, would be to reduce the influence of the dentate gyrus on CA3 at retrieval. As mentioned earlier, the DG’s primary function in the CLS model is to foster pattern separation. Thus, reducing the influence of the DG at retrieval should reduce pattern separation and — through this — boost pattern completion (see Becker, 2005 for additional discussion of this point).
In its current form, the CLS hippocampal model only incorporates a very crude version of mode-setting (such that EC is the primary influence on CA1 during study of new items, and CA3 is the primary influence on CA1 during retrieval). Incorporating the other mode-related optimizations mentioned above (e.g., varying the strength of CA3 recurrents to facilitate encoding vs. retrieval) should greatly improve the efficacy of the CLS hippocampal model.

**CLS model of cortical familiarity**

The CLS cortical model consists of an input layer (corresponding to lower regions of the cortical hierarchy) which projects in a feedforward fashion to a hidden layer (corresponding to perirhinal cortex). As mentioned earlier, the main function of cortex is to extract statistical regularities in the environment; the two-layer CLS cortical network (where “perirhinal” hidden units compete to encode regularities that are present in the input layer) is meant to capture this idea in the simplest possible fashion.

Because the cortical model uses a small learning rate, it is not capable of pattern completion following limited exposure to a stimulus. However, it is possible to extract a scalar signal from the cortical model that reflects stimulus familiarity: In the cortical model, as items are presented repeatedly, their representations in the upper (perirhinal) layer become *sharper*. Novel stimuli weakly activate a large number of perirhinal units, whereas previously presented stimuli strongly activate a relatively small number of units. Sharpening occurs in the model because Hebbian
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learning specifically tunes some perirhinal units to represent the stimulus. When a stimulus is first presented, some perirhinal units, by chance, will respond more strongly to the stimulus than other units. These “winning” units get tuned by CPCA Hebbian learning to respond even more strongly to the item then next time it is presented; this increased response triggers an increase in feedback inhibition to units in the layer, resulting in decreased activation of the “losing” units. This latter property (whereby some initially-responsive units drop out of the stimulus representation as it is repeated) is broadly consistent with the neurophysiological finding that some perirhinal neurons show decreased responding as a function of stimulus familiarity (e.g., Xiang & Brown, 1998; Li et al., 1993); see Section 2.2 (Alternative models of perirhinal familiarity), below, for additional discussion of single-cell-recording data from perirhinal cortex. Figure 2 illustrates this sharpening dynamic. In the Norman and O’Reilly (2003) paper, cortical familiarity was operationalized by reading out the activation of the $k$ winning units in the perirhinal layer (where $k$ is a model parameter that defines the maximum number of units that are allowed to be strongly active at once), although other methods of operationalizing familiarity are possible.

Because there is more overlap between representations in the cortical model vs. the hippocampal model, the familiarity signal generated by the cortical model has very different operating characteristics than the recall signal generated by the hippocampal model: In contrast to hippocampal recall, which only occurs when the test cue is very similar to a specific studied item, the cortical familiarity signal tracks — in a graded fashion — the amount of overlap between the test cue and the full set of studied items. This sensitivity to “global match” is one of the most critical psychological properties of the familiarity signal (for behavioral evidence that familiarity tracks global match, see, e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Koutstaal, Schacter, & Jackson, 1999; Shiffrin, Huber, & Marinelli, 1995; Criss & Shiffrin, 2004; see also Section 3 below for discussion of how abstract models implement a “global match” familiarity process).

\footnote{For additional discussion of how competitive learning can lead to sharpening, see, e.g., Grossberg, 1986, Section 23, and Grossberg & Stone, 1986, Section 16.}
Importantly, while the Norman and O’Reilly (2003) model focuses on the contribution of perirhinal cortex in familiarity discrimination, the CLS framework is entirely compatible with other theories that have emphasized the role of perirhinal cortex in representing high-level conjunctions of object features (e.g., Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002; Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Barense, Bussey, Lee, Rogers, Davies, Saksida, Murray, & Graham, 2005). The CLS cortical network performs competitive learning of object features in exactly the manner specified by these other models; the “sharpening” dynamic described above (which permits familiarity discrimination) is a byproduct of this feature extraction process. Another important point is that, according to the CLS model, perirhinal cortex works just like the rest of cortex. Its special role in familiarity discrimination (and learning of high-level object conjunctions) is attributable to its position at the top of the cortical hierarchy, which allows it to associate a wider range of features, and also allows it to respond differentially to novel combinations of these features (when discriminating between old and new items on a recognition test). For additional discussion of this point, see Norman and O’Reilly (2003).

**Representative prediction from the CLS model**

Norman and O’Reilly (2003) showed how, taken together, the hippocampal network and cortical network can explain a wide range of behavioral findings from recognition and recall list-learning experiments. Furthermore, because the CLS model maps clearly onto the brain, it is possible to use the model to address neuroscientific data in addition to (purely) behavioral data. Here, we discuss a representative model prediction, relating to how target-lure similarity and recognition test format should interact with hippocampal damage.

The CLS model predicts that cortex and hippocampus can both support good recognition performance when lures are not closely related to studied items. However, when lures are closely related to studied items, hippocampally-based recognition performance should be higher than cortically-based recognition performance, because of the hippocampus’ ability to assign distinct represen-
tations to similar stimuli, and its ability to reject lures when they trigger recall that mismatches the test cue. The model also predicts that effects of target-lure similarity should interact with test format. Most recognition tests use a yes-no (YN) format where test items are presented one at a time, and subjects are asked to label them as old or new. The model predicts that cortex should perform very poorly on YN tests with related lures (because the distributions of familiarity scores associated with studied items and related lures overlap strongly). However, the model predicts that cortex should perform much better when given a forced choice between studied items and corresponding related lures (e.g., “rat” and “rats” are presented simultaneously, and subjects have to choose which item was studied). In this situation, the model predicts that the mean difference in familiarity between the studied item and the related lure will be small, but the studied item should reliably be slightly more familiar than the corresponding related lure (thereby allowing for correct responding; see Hintzman, 1988 for additional discussion of this idea). Taken together, these predictions imply that patients with hippocampal damage should perform very poorly on YN tests with related lures. However, the same patients should show relatively spared performance on tests with unrelated lures, or when they are given a forced choice between targets and corresponding related lures (since cortex can pick up the slack in both cases). Holdstock, Mayes, Roberts, Cezayirli, Isaac, O’Reilly, and Norman (2002) and Mayes, Isaac, Downes, Holdstock, Hunkin, Montaldi, MacDonald, Cezayirli, and Roberts (2001) tested these predictions in a patient with focal hippocampal damage and obtained the predicted pattern of results; for additional evidence in support of these predictions, see also Westerberg, Paller, Weintraub, Mesulam, Holdstock, Mayes, and Reber (2006).

Memory decision-making: A challenge for recognition memory models

There is one major way in which the CLS model is presently underspecified: namely, how to combine the contributions of hippocampal recall and cortical familiarity when making recognition decisions. This problem is shared by all dual-process recognition memory models, not just CLS.
Norman and O’Reilly (2003) treat recognition decision-making as a “black box” that is external to the network model itself (i.e., the decision process is not itself simulated by a neural network). This raises two issues: First, at an abstract level, what algorithm should be implemented by the black box? Second, how could this algorithm be implemented in network form? In their combined cortico-hippocampal simulations, Norman and O’Reilly (2003) used a simple rule where test items were called “old” if hippocampal recall exceeded a certain value, otherwise, the decision was made based on familiarity (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997). This reflects the common assumption that recall is more diagnostic than familiarity. However, the diagnosticity of both recall and familiarity varies from situation to situation. For example, Norman and O’Reilly (2003) discuss how recall of unusual features is more diagnostic than recall of common features. Also, familiarity is less diagnostic when lures are highly similar to studied items, vs. when lures are less similar to studied items. Ideally, the decision-making algorithm would be able to dynamically weight the evidence provided by recall of a particular feature (relative to familiarity) based on its diagnosticity.

However, even if subjects manage to successfully compute the diagnosticity of each process, there are many reasons why (in a particular situation) subjects might deviate from this diagnosticity-based weighting. For example, several studies have found that dual-task demands hurt recall-based responding more than familiarity-based responding (e.g., Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997), suggesting that recall-based responding places stronger demands on cognitive resources than familiarity-based responding. If recall-based responding is generally more demanding than familiarity-based responding, this could cause subjects to under-attend to recall (even when it is useful). Furthermore, the reward structure of the task will interact with decision weights (e.g., if the task places a high premium on avoiding false alarms, subjects might attend relatively more to recall; see Malmberg & Xu, in press for additional discussion of how subjects weight recall vs. familiarity).

Finally, in constructing a model of memory decision-making, it is important to factor in more
dynamical aspects of the decision-making process. In recent years, models of memory decision-making have started to shift away from simple signal-detection accounts (where a cutoff is applied to a static memory strength value), toward models that accumulate evidence across time (see the chapter by Busemeyer & Johnson in this volume). While these dynamical “evidence-accumulation” models are more complex than models based on signal-detection theory (in the sense that they have more parameters), several researchers have demonstrated that evidence-accumulation models can be implemented using relatively simple neural network architectures (e.g., Usher & McClelland, 2001). As such, the shift to dynamical decision-making models may actually make it easier to construct a neural network model of memory decision-making processes. Overall, incorporating a more accurate model of the decision-making process (in terms of how recall and familiarity are weighted, in terms of temporal dynamics, and in terms of how this process is instantiated in the brain) should greatly increase the predictive utility of extant recognition memory models.

2.2. Alternative models of perirhinal familiarity

While (as mentioned above) the basic tenets of the CLS hippocampal model are relatively uncontroversial, there is much less agreement about whether the CLS cortical model adequately accounts for perirhinal contributions to recognition memory. Recently, the CLS cortical model was criticized by Bogacz and Brown (2003), on the grounds that it has inadequate storage capacity. Bogacz and Brown (2003) showed that, when input patterns are correlated with one another, the model’s capacity for familiarity discrimination (operationalized as the number of studied stimuli that the network can distinguish from nonstudied stimuli with 99% accuracy) barely increases as a function of network size; because of this, the model’s capacity (even in a “brain-sized” network) falls far short of the documented capacity of human recognition memory (e.g., Standing, 1973).

These capacity problems can be traced back to the CPCA Hebbian learning algorithm used by Norman and O’Reilly (2003). As discussed by Norman, Newman, and Perotte (2005), CPCA
Hebbian learning is insufficiently judicious in how it adjusts synaptic strengths: It strengthens synapses between co-active units even if the target memory is already strong enough to support recall, and it weakens synapses between active receiving units and all sending units that are inactive at the end of the trial, even if these units did not actively compete with recall of the target memory. As a result of this problem, CPCA Hebbian learning ends up over-representing features that are common to all items in the stimulus set, and under-representing features that are specific to individual items. Insofar as recognition depends on memory for item-specific features (common features are, by definition, useless for recognition, because they are shared by both studied items and lures), this tendency for CPCA Hebbian leaning to under-represent item-specific features results in poor recognition discrimination. In their paper, Bogacz and Brown (2003) also discuss a Hebbian familiarity discrimination model developed by Sohal and Hasselmo (2000). This model operates according to slightly different principles than the CLS cortical model, but it shares the same basic problem (over-focusing on common features) and thus performs poorly with correlated input patterns.

Given these capacity concerns, it is worth exploring how well other, recently developed models of perirhinal familiarity discrimination can address these capacity issues, as well as extant neurophysiological and psychological data on perirhinal contributions to recognition memory. Three alternative models are discussed below: a model developed by Bogacz and Brown (2003) that uses anti-Hebbian learning to simulate decreased responding to familiar stimuli; a model developed by Meeter, Myers, and Gluck (2005) that shows decreased responding to familiar stimuli because of context-driven adaptation effects; and a model developed by Norman, Newman, Detre, and Polyn (2006b) that probes the strength of memories by oscillating the amount of feedback inhibition.

The anti-Hebbian model

In contrast to the CLS familiarity model, in which familiarity discrimination was a byproduct of Hebbian feature extraction, the anti-Hebbian model proposed by Bogacz and Brown posits that
separate neural populations in perirhinal cortex are involved in representing stimulus features (on the one hand) vs. familiarity discrimination (on the other). Bogacz and Brown (2003) argue that neurons involved in familiarity discrimination use an anti-Hebbian learning rule, which weakens the weights from active pre-synaptic neurons to active post-synaptic neurons, and increases the weights from inactive pre-synaptic neurons. This anti-Hebbian rule causes neurons that initially respond to a stimulus to respond less on subsequent presentations of that stimulus.

The primary advantage of the anti-Hebbian model over the CLS model is improved capacity. Whereas Hebbian learning ends up over-representing common features and under-representing unique features (resulting in poor overall capacity), anti-Hebbian learning biases the network to ignore common features and to represent what is distinctive or unusual about individual patterns. Bogacz and Brown (2003) present a mathematical analysis showing that the anti-Hebbian model’s capacity for familiarity discrimination (given correlated input patterns) is orders of magnitude higher than the capacity of a model trained with Hebbian learning.

With regard to neurophysiological data: There are several salient differences in the predictions made by the anti-Hebbian model vs. the CLS cortical model. A foundational assumption of the Bogacz and Brown (2003) model is that neurons showing steady, above-baseline firing vs. decreased firing (as a function of stimulus repetition) belong to distinct neural populations: The former group (showing steady responding) is involved in representing stimulus features, whereas the latter group is involved in familiarity discrimination. This view implies that it should be impossible to find a neuron that shows steady responding to some stimuli and decreased responding to other stimuli. In contrast, the CLS cortical model posits that neurons that show steady (above-baseline) or increased firing to a given stimulus are the neurons that won the competition to represent this stimulus, and neurons that show decreased firing are the neurons that lost the competition to represent this stimulus. Furthermore, different neurons will win (vs. lose) the competition for different stimuli. Thus, contrary to the predictions of the Bogacz and Brown (2003) model, it should be possible to find a neuron that shows steady (or increased) responding to one stimulus (because it won the com-
petition to represent that stimulus) and decreased responding to another stimulus (because it lost the competition to represent that stimulus). More data need to be collected in order to test these predictions.

The Meeter, Myers, & Gluck (2005) model

The Meeter et al. (2005) model uses the same basic Hebbian learning architecture as Norman and O’Reilly (2003), with two critical changes: First, they added a neural adaptation mechanism (such that units become harder to activate after a period of sustained activation). Second, they are more explicit in considering how context is represented in the input patterns. According to the Meeter et al. (2005) model, if an item is presented in a particular context (e.g., in a particular room, on a particular computer screen, in a particular font), then the units activated by the item become linked to the units activated by contextual features. As a result of this item-context linkage, whenever the subject is in that context (and, consequently, context-sensitive neurons are firing), the linked item units will receive a small amount of activation. Over time, this low-level input from contextual features will lead to adaptation in the linked item units, thereby making them less likely to fire to subsequent repetitions of that item. In the Meeter et al. (2005) model, “context” is operationalized as a set of input units that receive constant (above-zero) excitation throughout the experiment; apart from this fact, context features function identically to units that represent the features of individual items.

This model has several attractive properties with regard to explaining data on single-unit activity in perirhinal cortex. It can account for the basic decrease in the neural response triggered by familiar vs. novel stimuli. Moreover, it provides an elegant explanation of why some perirhinal neurons do not show decreased responding with stimulus repetition. Contrary to the Bogacz and Brown (2003) idea that neurons showing decreased vs. steady responding come from separate populations (with distinct learning rules), the Meeter et al. (2005) model explains this difference in terms of a simple difference in context-sensitivity. Specifically: According to the Meeter et al.
(2005) model, neurons that receive input from a large number of contextual features will show decreased responding to repeated stimuli (insofar as these contextual inputs will cause the neuron to be tonically active, leading to adaptation), whereas neurons that are relatively insensitive to contextual features will not show decreased responding.

The most salient prediction of the Meeter model is that familiarity should be highly context-sensitive: Insofar as the strengthened context-item association formed at study is what causes adaptation, changing context between study and test should eliminate adaptation and thus eliminate the decrement in responding to previously studied stimuli. This prediction has not yet been tested. With regard to capacity, the Meeter et al. (2005) model uses the same Hebbian learning mechanism as the CLS model, so the same capacity issues that were raised by Bogacz and Brown (2003) (with regard to the CLS model) also apply here.

**The oscillating learning algorithm (Norman et al., in press)**

In response to the aforementioned problems with CPCA Hebbian learning, Norman et al. (in press; see also Norman et al., 2005) developed a new learning algorithm that (like CPCA Hebbian learning) does feature extraction, but (unlike CPCA Hebbian learning) is more judicious in how it adjusts synapses: It selectively strengthens weak parts of target memories (vs. parts that are already strong), and selectively punishes strong competitors. The algorithm memorizes patterns in the following manner:

- First, the to-be-learned (target) pattern is imposed on the network (via external inputs).

- Second, the algorithm identifies weak parts of the target memory by raising feedback inhibition above baseline. This increase can be viewed as a “stress test” on the target memory. If a target unit is receiving relatively little collateral support from other target units, such that its net input is just above threshold, raising inhibition will trigger a decrease in the activation of that unit. The algorithm then acts to strengthen units that drop out, by increasing connections coming into these units from active senders.
• Third, the algorithm identifies competing memories (non-target memories receiving strong input) by lowering feedback inhibition below baseline. Effectively, lowering inhibition lowers the threshold amount of excitation needed for a unit to become active. If a non-target unit is just below threshold (i.e., it is receiving strong input, but not quite enough to become active) lowering inhibition will cause that unit to become active. The algorithm then acts to weaken units that pop up, by weakening connections coming into these units from active senders.

Weight change in the model is accomplished via the well-established Contrastive Hebbian Learning (CHL) equation (Ackley, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1985; Hinton & Sejnowski, 1986; Hinton, 1989; Movellan, 1990). CHL learning involves contrasting a more desirable state of network activity (called the plus state) with a less desirable state of network activity (called the minus state). The CHL equation adjusts network weights to strengthen the more desirable state of network activity (so it is more likely to occur in the future) and weaken the less desirable state of network activity (so it is less likely to occur in the future).

\[ \Delta w_{ij} = \epsilon \left( (X^+_i Y^+_j) - (X^-_i Y^-_j) \right) \]  

(2)

In the above equation, \( X_i \) is the activation of the presynaptic (sending) unit, \( Y_j \) is the activation of the postsynaptic (receiving) unit. The \(^+\) and \(^-\) superscripts refer to plus-state and minus-state activity, respectively. \( \Delta w_{ij} \) is the change in weight between the sending and receiving units, and \( \epsilon \) is the learning rate parameter.

Changes in the strength of feedback inhibition have the effect of creating two kinds of “minus” states: Raising inhibition creates patterns that have too little activation (because target units drop out) and lowering inhibition creates patterns that have too much activation (because strong competitor units pop up). As inhibition is oscillated, the CHL equation is applied to states of network activation, with the normal-inhibition pattern serving as the plus state and the high-inhibition and
low-inhibition patterns serving as minus states (Norman et al., 2006b).

Because strengthening is limited to weak target features, the oscillating algorithm avoids the problem of “over-strengthening of common features” that plagues Hebbian learning. Also, the oscillating algorithm’s ability to selectively punish competitors helps to prevent similar memories from collapsing into one another: Whenever memories start to blend together, they also start to compete with one another at retrieval, and the competitor-punishment mechanism pushes them apart.³ Norman et al. (2006b) discuss how the oscillating algorithm may be implemented in the brain by neural theta oscillations (insofar as these oscillations involve regular changes in the strength of neural inhibition, and are present in both cortex and the hippocampus).

Recently, Norman et al. (2005) explored the oscillating algorithm’s ability to do familiarity discrimination. These simulations used a simple two-layer network: Patterns were presented to the lower part of the network (the input/output layer). The upper part of the network (the hidden layer) was allowed to self-organize according to the dictates of the learning algorithm. Every unit in the input/output layer was connected to every input/output unit (including itself) and to every hidden unit via modifiable, symmetric weights. A familiarity signal can be extracted from this network by looking at how activation changes when inhibition is raised above its baseline value: Weak (unfamiliar) memories show a larger decrease in activation than strong (familiar) memories. Norman et al. (2005) tested the network’s ability to discriminate between 100 studied and 100 nonstudied patterns, where the average pairwise overlap between any two patterns (studied or nonstudied) was 41%. After 10 study presentations, discrimination accuracy was effectively at ceiling (99%). In this same situation, the performance of the Norman and O’Reilly (2003) CLS familiarity model (trained with CPCA Hebbian learning) was close to chance. This finding shows that the oscillating algorithm can show good familiarity discrimination in exactly the kind of situation (i.e.,

³Importantly, unlike the CLS hippocampal model described earlier (which automatically enacts pattern separation, regardless of similarity), the oscillating algorithm is only concerned that memories observe a minimum separation from one another. So long as this constraint is met, memories in the cortical network simulated here are free to overlap according to their similarity (thereby allowing the network to enact similarity-based generalization).
high correlation between patterns) where the CLS familiarity model performs poorly. Although Norman et al. (2005) have not yet carried out the requisite mathematical analyses, it is quite possible that the oscillating algorithm’s capacity for supporting familiarity-based discrimination, in a brain-sized network, will be large enough to account for the vast capacity of human familiarity discrimination.

3. Abstract models of recognition and recall

In addition to the biologically-based models discussed above, there is a rich tradition of researchers building more abstract computational models of episodic memory. Although there is considerable diversity within the realm of abstract memory models, most of the abstract models that are currently being developed share a common set of properties: At study, memory traces are placed separately in a long-term store; because of this “separate storage” postulate, acquiring new memory traces does not affect the integrity of previously stored memory traces. At test, the model computes the match between the test cue and all of the items stored in memory. This item-by-item match information can be summed across all items to compute a “global match” familiarity signal. Some abstract models that conform to this overall structure are SAM (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988), REM (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Malmberg, Holden, & Shiffrin, 2004a), MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 1988), and NEMO (Kahana & Sekuler, 2002). Some notable exceptions to this general rule include the TODAM model (Murdock, 1993) and the Matrix model (Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1989), which store memory traces in a composite fashion (instead of storing them separately).

One of the most important properties of global matching models is that the match computation weights multiple matches to a single trace more highly than the same total number of matches, spread out across multiple memory traces (e.g., a test cue that matches two features of one item yields a higher familiarity signal than a test cue that matches one feature of each of two items);
see Clark and Gronlund (1996) for additional discussion of this point. Among other things, this property gives global matching models the ability to perform \textit{associative recognition} (i.e., to discriminate pairs of stimuli that were studied together vs. stimuli that were studied separately).

Different models achieve this sensitivity to conjunctions in different ways. For example, in MINERVA 2, memory traces are vectors where each element is 1 (indicating that a feature is present), -1 (indicating that the feature is absent), and 0 (indicating that the feature is unknown). To compute global match, MINERVA 2 first computes the match between the test cue and each trace $i$ stored in memory. Match is operationalized as the cue-trace dot product, divided by the number of features contributing to the dot product:

$$S_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} P_j T_{i,j}}{N_i}$$

(3)

$S_i$ is the match value, $P_j$ is the value of feature $j$ in the cue, $T_{i,j}$ is the value of feature $j$ in trace $i$, $N$ is the number of features, and $N_i$ is the number of features where either the cue or trace is nonzero.

Next, MINERVA 2 cubes each of these individual match scores to compute an “activation” value $A_i$ for each trace.

$$A_i = S_i^3$$

(4)

Finally, these activation values are summed together across the $M$ traces in memory to yield an “echo intensity” (global match) score $I$:

$$I = \sum_{i=1}^{M} A_i$$

(5)

MINERVA 2 shows sensitivity to conjunctions because matches spread across multiple stored
traces are combined in an additive fashion, but (because of the cube rule) multiple matches to a single trace are combined in a positively accelerated fashion. For example, consider the difference between two traces with match values $S_i$ of .5, vs. one trace with a match value $S_i$ of 1.0. Because of the cube rule, the total match value $I$ in the former case is $0.5^3 + 0.5^3 = 0.25$ whereas in the latter case $I = 1.0^3 = 1.0$.

The NEMO model (Kahana & Sekuler, 2002) achieves sensitivity to conjunctions in a similar fashion: First, NEMO computes a vector distance $d(i, j)$ between the cue and the memory trace (note: small distance = high similarity). Next, the distance value is passed through an exponential function, which — like the cube function — has the effect of emphasizing close matches (i.e., small distances) relative to weaker matches (i.e., large distances):

$$
\eta(i, j) = e^{-\tau d(i, j)}   \quad (6)
$$

In the above equation, $\eta(i, j)$ is the adjusted similarity score, and $\tau$ is a model parameter that determines the steepness of the generalization curve (i.e., how close does a match have to be in order to contribute strongly to the overall “summed similarity” score).

In abstract models, the same “match” rule that is used to compute the global-match familiarity signal is also used when simulating recall, although the specific way in which the match rule is used during recall differs from model to model. For example, MINERVA 2 simulates recall by computing a weighted sum $C$ of all of the items $i$ stored in memory, where each item is weighted by its match to the test cue. The $j$th element of $C$ is given by:

$$
C_j = \sum_{i=1}^{M} A_i T_{i,j}   \quad (7)
$$

In contrast, models like SAM and REM use the individual match scores to determine which (single) memory trace will be “sampled” for recall (see Section 3.1 below).
Collectively, abstract models have been very successful in explaining behavioral recall and recognition data from normal subjects (see Clark & Gronlund, 1996, Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 2002, and Raaijmakers, 2005 for reviews).4 The remaining part of this section is structured as follows: Section 3.1 presents a detailed description of the Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997) REM model. REM is highlighted because, of all of the models mentioned above, it is the model that is being developed and applied most actively, and because it has the most principled mathematical foundation. Section 3.2 describes important differences between “separate storage” abstract models (e.g., REM) and biological models with regard to their predictions about the mechanisms of interference (i.e., does studying new items degrade previously stored memory traces). Finally, whereas most abstract models try to explain recognition memory data solely in terms of the “global match” familiarity mechanism (and not recall), Section 3.3 reviews two recently developed dual-process abstract models that address contributions of both recall and familiarity to recognition performance.

3.1. The REM model of recognition and recall

The Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997) REM model is the most recent iteration of a line of models that dates back to the Raaijmakers and Shiffrin (1981) Search of Associative Memory (SAM) model. One of the main differences between REM and previous models like SAM and MINERVA 2 is that REM implements a principled Bayesian calculation of the likelihood that the cue “matches” (i.e., corresponds to the same item as) a particular stored memory trace, whereas the match calculation was not defined in Bayesian terms in previous models (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 2002; for another example of a model that takes this Bayesian approach see McClelland & Chappell, 1998; for additional discussion of Bayesian modeling see the chapter by Tenenbaum & Griffiths in this volume). The REM equations below were adapted from Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997), Xu and Malmberg (in

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4In principle, abstract models can be used to account for data from memory-impaired populations as well as normal populations (by finding a set of parameter changes that lead to the desired pattern of memory deficits) but, in practice, few studies have taken this approach — some notable exceptions include Malmberg, Zeelenberg, and Shiffrin (2004b) and Howard, Kahana, and Wingfield (in press-b).
In REM, items are vectors of features whose values, $V$, are geometrically distributed integers. Specifically, the probability of a particular feature being assigned a particular value is given by

$$P[V = j] = (1 - g)^{j-1}g$$

(8)

where $g$ is the geometric distribution parameter (with a value between 0 and 1). The primary consequence of feature values being distributed geometrically (according to Equation 8) is that high feature values are less common than low feature values.

When an item is studied, the features of that item are copied into an episodic trace for that item. The probability of storing a particular feature in an episodic trace is denoted by $u^*$. The probability of encoding that feature correctly (given that it has been stored) is denoted by $c$. If the feature is encoded incorrectly, a new value for that feature is randomly drawn from the geometric distribution. A zero value means that no value is stored for the feature.

At test, the retrieval cue is compared to each trace, and (for each trace $j$), the model calculates the likelihood $\lambda_j$ that the cue and the trace match (i.e., they correspond to the same item):

$$\lambda_j = (1 - c)^{n_{jq}} \prod_{i=1}^{\infty} \left[ \frac{c + (1 - c)g(1 - g)^{i-1}}{g(1 - g)^{i-1}} \right]^{n_{ijm}}$$

(9)

where $n_{jq}$ is the number of nonzero features in the $j$th memory trace that mismatch the cue (regardless of value) and $n_{ijm}$ is the number of nonzero features in the $j$th memory trace that match the cue and have value $i$. Equation 9 was derived by computing two different probabilities:

- The probability of obtaining the observed pattern of matching and mismatching features, assuming that the cue and trace correspond to the same item, and

- The probability of obtaining the observed pattern of matching and mismatching features, assuming that the cue and trace correspond to different items,
The likelihood value $\lambda_j$ is computed by dividing the former probability by the latter. Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997), Appendix A, contains a detailed derivation of Equation 9.

The same core “match” calculation is used for both recognition and recall in REM. The model is applied to recognition by computing

$$\Phi = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_j$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Mathematically, $\Phi$ corresponds to the overall odds that the item is old (vs. new). If the $\Phi$ exceeds a pre-set criterion (typically the criterion is set to $\Phi > 1.0$, indicating that the item is more likely to be old than new) then the item is called “old”. The fact that the effects of individual matches (and mismatches) are combined multiplicatively within individual traces (Equation 9) and additively across traces (Equation 10) serves the same function as the “cube rule” in MINERVA 2 and the exponential function in NEMO, i.e., it ensures that multiple matches to a single trace have a larger effect on $\Phi$ than the same number of feature matches, spread across multiple traces.

Recall in REM (like recall in SAM; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981) has both a sampling component (which picks a single trace out from the memory store) and a recovery component (which determines whether the sampled memory trace is retrieved successfully). Sampling is done with replacement. The probability of sampling image $I_j$, given the retrieval cue $Q$ is as follows:

$$P(I_j|Q) = \frac{\lambda_j^\gamma}{\sum_k \lambda_k^\gamma}$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

$\lambda_j$ is the match value (described above) for image $I_j$, and $\gamma$ is a scaling parameter. The denominator is the sum of the scaled likelihood ratios across the activated images. Once an item is sampled, the probability that the image will be recovered and output, $P(R)$, is given by

$$P(R) = \rho_r^\tau$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)
where $\rho_r$ is the proportion of correctly stored item features in that image and $\tau$ is a scaling parameter. Thus, in REM, well-encoded items are more likely to be recovered than poorly-encoded items.

**Representative REM results**

Researchers have demonstrated that REM can explain a wide range of episodic memory findings. For example, Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997) demonstrated that the “global match” familiarity mechanism described above can account for the word frequency mirror effect: the finding that subjects make more false alarms to high-frequency lures vs. low-frequency lures, and that subjects make more correct “old” responses to low-frequency targets vs. high-frequency targets (e.g., Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993). REM’s account of word frequency effects is based on the idea that low-frequency (LF) words have more unusual features than high-frequency (HF) words; specifically, REM can fit the observed pattern of word frequency effects by using a slightly lower value of the geometric distribution parameter $g$ when generating LF items, which results in these items having slightly higher (and thus more unusual) feature values (see Equation 8). The fact that LF items have unusual features has two implications: First, it means that LF lures are not likely to spuriously match stored memory traces — this explains why there are fewer LF false alarms than HF false alarms. Second, it means that, when LF cues do match stored traces, this is strong evidence that the item was studied (because matches to unusual features are unlikely to occur due to chance); as such, LF targets tend to trigger high likelihood ($\lambda$) values, which explains why the hit rate is higher for LF targets than HF targets.

One implication of this account is that, if one could engineer a situation where the (unusual) features of LF lures match stored memory traces as often as the (more common) features of HF lures, subjects will show a higher false alarm rate for LF lures than HF lures (the reverse of the normal pattern). This prediction was tested and confirmed by Malmberg et al. (2004a), who induced a high rate of “spurious match” for low-frequency lures by using lures that were highly similar to
studied items (e.g., study “yachts”, test with “yacht”).

3.2. Differences in how models explain interference

One important difference between “separate storage” abstract models like REM and biological models like CLS relates to sources of interference. In REM, memory traces are stored in a non-interfering fashion, and interference arises at test (whenever the test cue matches memory traces other than the target memory trace). For example, SAM and REM predict that strengthening some list items (by presenting them repeatedly) will impair recall of non-strengthened items, by increasing the odds that the strengthened items will be sampled instead of non-strengthened items (Malmberg & Shiffrin, 2005). Effectively, the model’s ability to sample these non-strengthened items is blocked by sampling of the strengthened items.

Biological models, like abstract models, posit that interference can occur at test (due to competition between the target memory and non-target memories). However, in contrast to models like REM, biological models also posit that interference can occur at study: Insofar as learning in biological models involves both strengthening and weakening of synapses, adjusting synapses to store one memory could end up weakening other memories that also rely on those synapses. This trace weakening process is sometimes referred to as structural interference (Murnane & Shiffrin, 1991) or unlearning (e.g., Melton & Irwin, 1940).

Models like SAM and REM have focused on interference at test, as opposed to structural interference at study, for two reasons:

- The first reason is parsimony: Models that rely entirely on interference at test can account for a very wide range of forgetting data. In particular, Mensink and Raaijmakers (1988) showed that a variant of the SAM model can account for several phenomena that were previously

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5Within the realm of abstract models positing interference-at-test, there is some controversy about whether interference arises from spurious matches to other items on the study list, as opposed to spurious matches to memory traces from outside the experimental context; see Dennis and Humphreys (2001) and Criss and Shiffrin (2004) for contrasting perspectives on this issue.
attributed to unlearning (e.g., retroactive interference in AB-AC interference paradigms; Barnes & Underwood, 1959).

- The second reason is that it is unclear how to instantiate structural interference properly within a separate-storage framework. For example, in REM, structural interference would presumably involve deletion of features from episodic traces, but it is unclear which features to delete. Biologically-based neural network models fare better in this regard, insofar as these models incorporate synaptic learning rules that explicitly specify how to adjust synaptic strengths (upward or downward) as a function of presynaptic and postsynaptic activity.

The most important open issue, with regard to modeling interference and forgetting, is whether there are any results in the literature that can only be explained by positing trace-weakening mechanisms. Michael Anderson has argued that certain findings in the retrieval-induced forgetting literature may meet this criterion (see Anderson, 2003 for a review). In retrieval-induced forgetting experiments, subjects study a list of items, and then a subset of the studied items are strengthened during a second “practice” phase. Anderson and others have found that manipulations that affect the degree of retrieval competition during the practice phase (e.g., whether subjects are given a well-specified cue or a poorly-specified cue; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000) can affect the extent to which non-practiced items are forgotten, without affecting the extent to which practiced items are strengthened. Anderson (2003) explains these results in terms of the idea that (i) competitors are weakened during memory retrieval, and (ii) the degree of weakening is proportional to the degree of competition. Anderson also points out that simple “blocking” accounts of forgetting may have difficulty explaining the observed pattern of results (increased forgetting without increased strengthening): According to these blocking accounts, forgetting of non-strengthened items is a direct consequence of strengthened items being recalled in place of non-strengthened items.

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6See Norman, Newman, & Detre, 2006a for a neural network model of retrieval-induced forgetting that instantiates these ideas about competitor-weakening; the model uses the oscillating learning algorithm described earlier to strengthen the practiced item and weaken competitors.
items; as such, practice manipulations that lead to the same amount of strengthening should lead to the same amount of forgetting. At this point, it is unclear whether separate-storage models like REM (which are considerably more sophisticated than the simple blocking theories described by Anderson, 2003) can account for the retrieval-induced forgetting results described here.

3.3. Abstract models and dual-process theories

Abstract models have traditionally taken a single-process approach to recognition, whereby they try to explain recognition performance exclusively in terms of the global match familiarity process (without positing that recall of specific details contributes to recognition). As with the structural-interference issue above, the main reason that abstract models have taken this approach is parsimony: The single-process approach has been extremely successful in accounting for recognition data, hence there is no need to complicate the model by positing that recall contributes routinely to recognition judgments. However, more recently, Malmberg et al. (2004a) and Xu and Malmberg (in press) have identified some data patterns (from paradigms that use lures that are closely related to studied items) that cannot be fully explained using the REM familiarity process. Specifically, studies using related lures (e.g., switched-plurality lures: study “rats”, test “rat”) have found that increasing the number of study presentations of “rats” increases hits, but does not reliably increase false recognition of similar lures like “rat”. Dual-process models can explain this result in terms of the idea that increased study of “rats” increases the familiarity of “rat” (which tends to boost false recognition), but it also increases the odds that subjects will recall that they studied “rats”, not “rat” (Hintzman, Curran, & Oppy, 1992). Malmberg et al. (2004a) showed that the REM global match process can not simultaneously generate an increase in hit rates, coupled with no change (or a decrease) in false alarm rates to similar lures (see Xu & Malmberg, in press for a similar finding, using an associative recognition paradigm).

In response to this issue, Malmberg et al. (2004a) developed a dual-process REM model of recognition, which incorporates both the REM “global match” familiarity judgment and the REM
recall process described earlier. This model operates in the following manner: First, stimulus familiarity is computed (using Equation 9). If familiarity is below a threshold value, the item is called “new”. If familiarity is above the threshold value, the recall process is engaged. The model samples a single memory trace and attempts to recover the contents of that trace. If recovery succeeds and the recovered item matches the test cue, the item is called “old”. If recovery succeeds and the recovered item mismatches the test cue (e.g., the model recalls “rats” but the test cue is “rat”), the item is called “new”. If the recovery process fails, the model guesses “old” with probability \( \gamma \). The addition of this extra recall process allows the model to accommodate the combination of increasing hits and no increase in false alarms to similar lures.

The SAC model Reder’s SAC (Source of Activation Confusion) model (e.g., Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Schunn, Ayers, Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000) takes a different approach to simulating contributions of recall and familiarity to recognition memory. In the SAC model, items are represented as nodes in a network; episodic memory traces are represented as special nodes that are linked both to the item and to a node representing the experimental context. Activation is allowed to spread at test; the degree of spreading activation coming out of a node is a function of the node’s activation and also the number of connections coming out of the node (the more connections, the less activation that spreads per connection; for discussion of empirical evidence that supports this “fan effect” assumption, see Anderson & Reder, 1999; see also Anderson & Lebiere, 1998 for discussion of another model that incorporates this assumption). In SAC, familiarity is a function of the activation of the item node itself, whereas recall is a function of the activation of the episodic node that was created when the item was studied.

Reder et al. (2000) demonstrated that the SAC model can account for word frequency mirror effects. According to SAC, the false alarm portion of the mirror effect (false alarms to HF lures

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7To accommodate the idea that subjects rely more on recall in some situations than others (see the Memory decision-making section above), the dual-process version of REM includes an extra model parameter (a) that scales the probability of using recall on a given trial.
false alarms to LF lures) is due to familiarity, and the hit-rate portion of the mirror effect (hit rate for LF targets > hit rate for HF targets) is due to recall (for similar views, see Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Hirshman, Fisher, Henthorn, Arndt, & Passannante, 2002). In SAC, the fact that HF lures have been presented more often than LF lures (prior to the experiment) gives them a higher baseline level of activation, and — through this — a higher level of familiarity. The fact that LF targets are linked to fewer pre-experimental contexts than HF targets, and thus have a smaller “fan factor”, means that activity can spread more efficiently to the “episodic node” associated with the study event (leading to a higher hit rate for LF items).

Reder et al. (2000) argue that this dual-process account of mirror effects is preferable to the REM account insofar as it models frequency differences in terms of actual differences in the number of pre-experimental presentations, instead of the idea (used by REM) that LF words have more unusual features than HF words. However, it remains to be seen whether the Reder et al. (2000) model provides a better overall account of word frequency effects than REM (in terms of model fit, and in terms of novel, validated predictions).

4. Context, free recall and active maintenance

Up to this point, this chapter has discussed accounts of how the memory system responds to a particular cue, but it has not yet touched on how the memory system behaves when external cues are less well-specified, and subjects have to generate their own cues in order to target a particular memory (or set of memories). Take the scenario of trying to remember where you left your keys. The most common advice in this situation is to reinstate your mental context as a means of prompting recall — if you succeed in remembering what you were doing and what you were thinking earlier in the day, this will boost the probability of recalling where you left the keys. This idea of reinstating mental context plays a key role in theories of strategic memory search. Multiple laboratory paradigms have been developed to examine this process of strategic memory search.
The most commonly used paradigm is free recall, where subjects are given a word list and are then asked to retrieve the studied word list in any order. Section 4.1 describes an abstract modeling framework, the Temporal Context Model (TCM; Howard & Kahana, 2002), that has proved to be very useful in understanding how we selectively retrieve memories from a particular temporal context in free recall experiments. Section 4.2 discusses methods for implementing TCM dynamics in biologically-based neural network models.

4.1. The temporal context model (TCM)

TCM is the most recent in a long succession of models that use a drifting mental context to explain memory targeting (e.g., Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988; Estes, 1955). The basic idea behind these models is that the subject’s inner mental context (comprised of the constellation of thoughts that are active at a particular moment) changes gradually over time. Mensink and Raaijmakers (1988) instantiate this idea in terms of a binary context vector, where each element of this context vector is updated (with some probability) on each time step; the higher the probability of updating, the faster the context vector drifts over time. During the study phase of a memory experiment, items are associated with the state of the context vector (at the time of presentation). At test, the recall process is initiated by cuing with the current state of the context vector, which (in turn) triggers retrieval of items that were associated with these contextual elements at study.

The main difference between TCM and previous contextual-drift models like Mensink and Raaijmakers (1988) is that — in TCM — context does not drift randomly. Rather, contextual updating is driven by the features of the items being studied. More precisely, the state of the context vector at time $i$, $t_i$, is given by:

$$t_i = \rho_i t_{i-1} + \beta t^{IN}_i,$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

where $\beta$ is a free parameter that determines the rate of contextual drift, $\rho_i$ is chosen at each
time step such that \( t_i \) is always of unit length, and \( t_i^{IN} \) corresponds to “pre-experimental context” associated with the item being studied at time \( i \) (i.e., an amalgamation of all of the contexts in which that item has previously appeared). The key thing to note is that pre-experimental context is different for each item; thus, adding \( t_i^{IN} \) to the context vector has the effect of injecting specific information about the just-studied item into the context vector.

The most current version of TCM (Howard et al., in press-b) posits that, on a given time step, the current item is associated with active contextual features, and then the context vector is updated according to Equation 13. Thus, the item studied at time \( i \) ends up being associated with the state of the context vector that was computed on time step \( i - 1 \). At test, the free recall process is initiated by cuing with the current state of the context vector. As in SAM, items are sampled according to how well the context cue matches the context associated with the stored item (see Howard & Kahana, 2002 for more detailed description of how item-context associations are formed at study, and how items are sampled at test). If the item studied at time \( i \) is sampled at time step \( r \), the context is updated according to the following equations:

\[
t_r = \rho_i t_{r-1} + \beta t_r^{IN},
\]

(14)

where \( t_r^{IN} \) (the information injected into the context vector) is given by:

\[
t_r^{IN} = \alpha_O t_i^{IN} + \alpha_N t_{i-1} + \eta n_r.
\]

(15)

In Equation 15, \( t_i^{IN} \) is the pre-experimental context associated with item \( i \), \( t_{i-1} \) is the contextual information that was associated with item \( i \) at study, and \( n_r \) is a noise term. \( \alpha_O \), \( \alpha_N \), and \( \eta \) are scaling parameters. Thus, the context-updating operation associated with recalling item \( i \) has much in common with the context-updating operation associated with studying item \( i \). In both cases, context is updated by injecting \( t_i^{IN} \) (item-specific information relating to item \( i \)). The main
difference, apart from the noise term, is that context is also updated with $t_{i-1}$, the state of the context vector at the time the (just-retrieved) item was studied. This latter updating operation can be construed as “mentally jumping back in time” to the moment when the (just-retrieved) item was studied. As discussed below, the two kinds of updating mentioned here ($t_i^{IN}$ vs. $t_{i-1}$) have distinct effects on recall transition probabilities. Once the context vector is updated, it is used to cue for additional items, which leads to additional updating of the context vector, and so on.

**How TCM accounts for recall data**

Contextual drift models (in general) and TCM (in particular) can account for a wide range of free recall findings; some representative findings are discussed in this section.

As one example, contextual drift models provide an elegant account of the *long-term recency effect* in free recall. Circa 1970, it was believed that recency effects (better recall of items from the end of the list) were attributable to the fact that recently presented items were still being held in a short-term memory buffer. As such, manipulations that disrupt this buffer (e.g., a distraction-filled retention interval) should sharply reduce recency effects. However, Bjork and Whitten (1974) and other studies have since demonstrated that recency effects can still be observed after a distraction-filled delay. Bjork and Whitten (1974) showed that the key determinant of recency is the *ratio* of the time elapsed since study of item A vs. and the time elapsed since study of item B; the smaller this ratio is (indicating that A was presented relatively more recently than B), the better A will be recalled relative to B (Glenberg, Bradley, Stevenson, Kraus, Tkachuk, Gretz, Fish, & Turpin, 1980). This can be explained by contextual drift models, in the following manner:

- Because of contextual drift, the current test context (being used as a cue) matches the context associated with recently presented items more than the context associated with less recently presented items.

- Since recall is a competitive process, recall of a particular trace is a function of the match
between the cue and that trace, relative to other cue-trace match values. Increasing the recency of item A (relative to item B) increases the extent to which the test cue matches the A-context vs. the B-context, thereby boosting recall of A relative to B.

Critically, in order to explain recency effects, the rate of drift can not be too fast — if, e.g., all of the contextual elements changed on every trial, then recently presented items would not have any more “contextual match” than less recently presented items. Put another way, at least some contextual elements need to persist long enough to span the gap between recently presented studied items and the time of test.

In their 2002 paper, Howard & Kahana also showed that TCM can account for detailed patterns of transition data in free recall: Given that the Nth item from the study list was just recalled, what are the odds that the next item recalled will be the N+1st item, N-1st item, N+2nd item, and so on? Kahana (1996) plotted this conditional response probability (CRP) curve (see also Howard & Kahana, 1999). A representative CRP curve is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Conditional response probability (CRP) curve, showing the probability of recalling an item studied at serial position \(i + \text{lag}\) immediately after recall of an item studied at serial position \(i\) (Figure courtesy of Marc Howard). This particular CRP curve was created by averaging together the CRP curves from multiple studies; see the caption of Figure 1A in Howard et al. (in press-a) for more details.
There are two major findings to highlight. First, items that are studied in nearby serial positions in the study list tend to be recalled close together at test (Kahana, 1996 calls this regularity the lag-recency effect). This holds true even if filled distractor intervals are inserted between items at study, making it unlikely that these contiguity effects are due to subjects rehearsing contiguous items together in short-term memory. This basic regularity can be explained in terms of the idea that, when subjects retrieve an item, they retrieve contextual features associated with that item, and then they use these retrieved contextual features to cue for more items. Insofar as items studied close in time to one another have similar context vectors, cuing with contextual information from time $t$ will facilitate recall of other items studied in (temporal) proximity to time $t$.

Howard and Kahana (2002) point out retrieved context from the study phase ($t_{i-1}$ from Equation 15) is a temporally symmetric cue: Assuming a steady rate of “contextual drift”, the context active at one point in time should match the context from the preceding time step just as well as it matches the context from the following time step. However, as clearly shown in Figure 3, the CRP curve is asymmetric: Subjects are more likely to recall in the forward direction than the backward direction. This can be explained in terms of the idea that $t_{i}^{IN}$ (the item-specific information that is injected into the context vector when item $i$ is studied, and when it is retrieved at test) is an asymmetric cue: This information is present in the context vector for items that were studied after the retrieved item, but not for items that were studied before the retrieved item. Thus, cuing with this item-specific information at test biases recall in the forward direction.

4.2. TCM in the brain

Importantly, TCM is not meant to stand on its own as a full-fledged model. Rather it provides an abstract blueprint for how models can account for serial-position & transition data in free recall. Given this blueprint, a key challenge for computational models of episodic memory is to determine how these dynamics could be implemented in a neural network.

The next part of this section shows how neural network architectures that are capable of active
maintenance can serve as the “context vector” in models of long-term memory. Traditionally, active maintenance networks have been used to model performance in short-term (working) memory tasks (e.g., Botvinick & Plaut, 2006; Usher & Cohen, 1999). A synthesis is proposed whereby active maintenance systems serve a dual role: They directly support performance on short-term memory tasks, and they also serve to contextualize episodic memory (via associations that are formed at study between the representation of the item being studied, and other representations that are currently being maintained in active memory). Finally, the roles of different brain systems in implementing TCM dynamics are discussed, with a particular focus on prefrontal cortex and entorhinal cortex.

Architectures for active maintenance

The discussion of TCM, above, indicates that the context vector should have the following properties:

- When an item is studied, the context vector should be updated with information relating to that item.

- Information in the context vector needs to persist across multiple trials and possibly longer (but not indefinitely). This persistent activity creates the “drift” dynamic whereby recently presented items match the current context more than less-recently presented items.

Below, two network architectures are described that meet these criteria. Both models were originally developed to account for working memory data (e.g., recall of items from a short-term buffer). The same active maintenance mechanisms that allow these models to support working memory performance also imbue the models with the requisite context-vector properties (i.e., item-specific updating and slow drift over time).

The Usher & Cohen (1999) localist attractor network In this network, when an item is presented, it triggers activation in the corresponding unit of the attractor network, which is then sus-
tained (via a self-connection in that unit) over an extended period of time. Multiple units can be active at once, so the state of the network at any one time reflects contributions from multiple recently presented items. The total amount of network activity is limited by inhibitory connections between the units. Because of these inhibitory interactions, activating a new unit in the buffer reduces the activation of other units in the buffer, eventually causing them to drop out entirely. This dynamic causes the overall state of the buffer to drift over time.

**The O’Reilly & Frank (2006) prefrontal network** Recently, O’Reilly and Frank (2006; Frank, Loughry, & O’Reilly, 2001) developed a network architecture for active maintenance that is based explicitly on the neural architecture of prefrontal cortex (PFC). The network consists of multiple *stripes* (separate subregions of PFC; Levitt, Lewis, Yoshioka, & Lund, 1993; Pucak, Levitt, Lund, & Lewis, 1996), each of which is capable of actively maintaining (via bistable neuronal activity; Durstewitz, Kelc, & Gunturkun, 1999; Durstewitz, Seamans, & Sejnowski, 2000; Fellous, Wang, & Lisman, 1998) information about recently presented stimuli. Each PFC stripe has a corresponding region of the basal ganglia that controls when information should be gated into or out of that stripe. When a given stimulus is presented, information about that stimulus will be gated into some number of stripes and then actively maintained (possibly overwriting information about other stimuli that was previously being maintained in those stripes). At any given moment, the state of the PFC network will reflect a combination of influences from multiple recently-presented items.

The above list is not meant to be exhaustive. On the contrary, almost any network that is capable of maintaining information pertaining to multiple, recently presented items has the requisite properties to serve as the context vector.⁸

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⁸One other architecture worth mentioning in this regard is the Simple Recurrent Network (SRN; Elman, 1991). See Botvinick and Plaut (2006) for discussion of how SRNs can be used to model short-term recall data, and see Howard and Kahana (2002) for discussion of how SRNs can instantiate the TCM contextual drift dynamic. For additional discussion of models of active maintenance, see the chapter by De Pisapia, Repovs, and Braver in this volume.
Integrating active maintenance and long-term memory

At this point in time, only one model has been developed that uses an active maintenance network to contextualize long-term memory. This model (constructed by Polyn, Norman, & Cohen, 2003) is discussed below, along with another free recall model presented by Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, and Usher (2005). The Davelaar et al. (2005) model does not meet the TCM criteria in its current form, but it can easily be modified to meet these criteria.

The Polyn, Norman, & Cohen (2003) model This model merges the CLS cortical network and hippocampal network with a simplified variant of the O’Reilly and Frank (2006) PFC model. The “posterior cortex” part of the network (which has an architecture similar to the CLS cortical model described earlier) represents the item currently being presented; the PFC network actively maintains features from multiple, recently presented items; and the hippocampal model binds information in posterior cortex to the actively maintained PFC pattern. In this manner, the pattern of activity in PFC (at the moment that an item is studied) serves to contextualize that item representation. When an episodic memory (consisting of an item representation in posterior cortex and the associated PFC “context” representation) is retrieved at test, the current PFC representation is updated in two ways: The retrieved PFC pattern from the study phase is loaded directly into PFC, and the retrieved item representation is used to update PFC (in the exact same way that item information is used to update PFC at study). These two types of updating correspond directly to the two types of context-updating used by TCM (as described earlier). Polyn et al. (2003) showed that the model can account for data on recall transitions and other findings (see also Polyn, 2005), but the model is still in an early phase of development.

The Davelaar et al. (2005) free recall model The goal of the Davelaar et al. (2005) paper was to address data showing that recall from a short-term buffer and recall from long-term memory both contribute to free recall (e.g., the finding from Carlesimo, Marfia, Loasses, & Caltagirone, 1996 that amnesics show intact recall of the last few list items on an immediate recall test, but not on
a delayed recall test; presumably, this occurs because amnesics can rely on their intact short-term buffer given immediate testing but not delayed testing; see Davelaar et al., 2005 for a list of other relevant phenomena). To model the contributions of short-term memory, the Davelaar et al. (2005) model includes a variant of the Usher and Cohen (1999) localist attractor network described above. However, instead of using states of this localist attractor network to contextualize long-term recall, the Davelaar et al. (2005) model contextualizes recall using a separate, specialized context layer that operationalizes contextual drift as a one-dimensional random walk. States of the randomly drifting context vector are episodically associated with simultaneously active states of the localist attractor network. At retrieval, items are directly read out from the localist attractor network (to model short-term recall), then the context vector is allowed to randomly drift (as it did at study), cuing — as it drifts — episodic recall of items that were associated with the currently active context state. The context-updating mechanism used by Davelaar et al. (2005) constitutes a step backward from TCM: Because context-updating is random, as opposed to being driven by item-specific information (as in TCM), the Davelaar et al. (2005) model fails to provide a principled account of some findings (e.g., the forward asymmetry in the conditional response probability curve) that are explained very naturally by TCM.9

According to the “dual role” hypothesis outlined above, it seems possible that one could improve the fit of the Davelaar et al. (2005) model to the data, and simultaneously simplify the model, by eliminating the (randomly drifting) context vector, and using the information maintained in the short-term memory buffer to contextualize long-term item memory. However, additional simulation work is required to assess whether this simplified model can account for all of the findings described in the Davelaar et al. (2005) paper as well as the lag-recency findings described by Howard and Kahana (2002).10 One major challenge will be accounting for effects of distracting

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9To account for the forward asymmetry in the CRP curve, Davelaar et al. (2005) add an extra parameter to their model that directly imposes a forward bias on the contextual random walk.

10These ideas about integrating models of short-term and long-term memory were spurred by discussions at the 3rd Annual Context and Memory Symposium in March, 2005 in Philadelphia, PA.
mental activity on recall. Several studies have obtained recency and lag-recency effects in *continuous distractor* paradigms, where an involving secondary task (e.g., mental arithmetic) is interposed between study trials (e.g., Howard & Kahana, 1999). These findings suggest that the temporal continuity of the context vector is preserved in the face of distraction. However, there have been numerous demonstrations that distracting activity can reduce recall of items from short-term (active) memory to near-floor levels (e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1959). In order to simultaneously explain these findings, models of the sort being discussed here (i.e., positing that the context vector and short-term memory buffer are coextensive) would have to posit that distraction degrades actively maintained representations, so they no longer support explicit recovery of items from short-term memory. However, so long as distraction does not completely eradicate the contents of active memory (i.e., so long as there is still some carry-over of activity from previously studied items) the pattern of activity in active memory should still be able to serve as a drifting context vector that supports long-term recency and lag-recency effects.\footnote{For additional discussion of the role of context in short-term and long-term recall, see Burgess and Hitch (2005).}

Relevant brain structures

As of now, there is still extensive debate in the literature regarding which brain regions contribute most strongly to the context vector. Given the well-accepted role of PFC in active maintenance/working memory (based on neurophysiological findings in animals, human imaging studies, and human lesion studies showing that patients with PFC damage are selectively impaired in tests that tap memory for context, e.g., free recall & recency judgments; e.g., Shimamura, 1994), it stands to reason that PFC would play an especially important role in establishing the kinds of contextual drift required by the TCM model. Furthermore, anatomical studies have established that there are several pathways connecting PFC and the hippocampus (see, e.g., Morris, Pandya, & Petrides, 1999; Goldman-Rakic, Selemon, & Schwartz, 1984; Russchen, Amaral, & Price, 1987; Ferino, Thierry, & Glowinski, 1987; Jay & Witter, 1991). Many of these pathways feed into the...
entorhinal cortex before projecting into the hippocampus proper. These pathways would allow the hippocampus to bind actively maintained information in PFC (serving as a context vector) with bottom-up activity in posterior cortex (corresponding to the currently presented stimulus).

For these reasons, the Polyn et al. (2003) model makes an explicit commitment to the idea that PFC is driving contextual drift. However, not all recently developed models have committed to this idea. The most prominent contrary view comes from Howard, Fotedar, Datey, and Hasselmo (2005), who have argued that entorhinal cortex (EC) has *intrinsic maintenance properties* that allow it to serve as the TCM context vector (regardless of the input that it receives from PFC). Howard et al. (2005) cite evidence from Egorov, Hamam, Fransen, Hasselmo, and Alonso (2002), showing that layer V of entorhinal cortex shows persistent neural activity in the absence of bottom-up stimulation, and thus can serve as a “neural integrator” that combines information from several recently presented stimuli. In summary, both the Polyn et al. (2003) model and the Howard et al. (2005) model posit that EC is involved in representing temporal context, but for different reasons: According to Polyn et al. (2003), EC is important because it serves as a conduit between PFC and the hippocampus, whereas Howard et al. (2005) posit that EC is important because of its intrinsic capability for active maintenance. At this point, the most plausible view is that both accounts are correct. 12

5. Conclusions

Looking back on the past several decades, modelers have made tremendous strides toward understanding the mechanisms underlying episodic memory. As discussed in Section 3, abstract modelers have derived mathematically principled accounts of some of the most puzzling phenomena in episodic memory (e.g., how stimulus repetition affects false recognition of similar lures).

12The above discussion has focused on how PFC and EC contribute to temporal targeting (i.e., selective retrieval of items from a particular temporal context). For a model of how PFC contributes to semantic targeting (i.e., organizing recall such that semantically similar items are recalled together) see Becker and Lim (2003).
There is an emerging consensus between biological and abstract models that both recall and familiarity can contribute to recognition memory (although the factors that determine how much recall contributes in a given situation need to be described in more detail). Another point of agreement between abstract and biological models is that interference between memory traces at retrieval can cause forgetting. One remaining issue is whether structural interference occurs between memory traces during learning (i.e., does acquiring new memories cause weakening of existing traces), and — if it occurs — how it affects behavioral memory performance. Biological models typically are subject to structural interference, but abstract models that store memory traces separately (e.g., REM) do not suffer from structural interference.

While abstract models of episodic memory have been around for quite a while, modelers have only recently started to apply biologically-based models to detailed patterns of episodic memory data. The combined influence of behavioral and neural constraints has led to rapid evolution of these biologically-based models:

- As discussed in Section 2.1, there is now widespread agreement among modelers regarding how the hippocampus supports completion of missing pieces of previously stored cortical patterns, and how pattern separation mechanisms in the hippocampus allow it to rapidly memorize patterns without suffering catastrophic interference. One of the largest remaining challenges is understanding how the hippocampus manages to flip between “modes” where pattern separation predominates (to facilitate encoding) and modes where pattern completion predominates (to facilitate retrieval).

- With regard to modeling perirhinal contributions to familiarity-based recognition: As discussed in Section 2.2, some models of perirhinal familiarity (e.g., the CLS cortical model) can be ruled out based on capacity concerns. However, there are several other models with no obvious capacity problems that can fit basic aspects of extant neurophysiological data (e.g., decreased firing of some perirhinal neurons with stimulus repetition). More simula-
tion work needs to be done, and additional neurophysiological and behavioral experiments need to be run (e.g., looking at the context-dependence of familiarity), in order to assess the detailed fit of these remaining models to experimental data on familiarity-based recognition.

- Finally, as discussed in Section 4, modelers have started to explore the idea that the pattern of actively maintained information in prefrontal cortex can serve as a drifting context vector. This actively maintained information is fed into entorhinal cortex (which may have intrinsic maintenance properties of its own), where it is bound together (by the hippocampus) with information pertaining to the currently presented item. This dynamic allows neural models to mimic the functioning of abstract contextual-drift models like TCM (Howard & Kahana, 2002), which (in turn) should allow the models to explain detailed patterns of recency and lag-recency data from free recall experiments.

The next challenge for biologically-based models is to assemble these pieces into a unified theory. Even though there is general agreement about how this “unified theory” should be structured, there are an enormous number of critical details that need to be filled in. Some of these missing details were mentioned in the chapter (e.g., decision-making mechanisms for recognition memory) but there are innumerable other details that were not explicitly mentioned (e.g., what rules govern when information is gated into and out of active memory — see O’Reilly & Frank, 2006). In the process of working out these details, it will almost certainly become necessary to consider the contributions of other brain structures (e.g., the basal ganglia) that were not discussed at length in this chapter. Also, the models discussed in this chapter contain major simplifications. In particular, most of the models discussed here use rate-coded neurons (instead of spiking neurons) and static input patterns (instead of temporal sequences). Achieving a complete understanding of episodic memory will almost certainly require consideration of spiking neurons, spike-time-dependent learning rules, and sequence memory (for contrasting perspectives on how these factors interact, see Mehta, Lee, & Wilson, 2002 and Jensen & Lisman, 2005).
Any model that combines hippocampal, perirhinal, and prefrontal networks is going to be complex. The main factor that makes this complexity manageable is the sheer number of constraints that can be applied to biologically-based models: In addition to constraints arising from behavioral data, we have discussed neuroanatomical constraints (e.g., regarding the connectivity of hippocampal subregions), neurophysiological constraints (e.g., how individual perirhinal neurons are affected by stimulus familiarity), neuropsychological constraints (e.g., how hippocampal lesions affect discrimination of studied items and similar lures), and functional constraints (e.g., ensuring that models of familiarity discrimination have adequate capacity when they are given a “brain-sized” number of neurons). In the future, neuroimaging data will also serve as an important source of model constraints (see, e.g., Deco, Rolls, & Horwitz, 2004 and Sohn, Goode, Stenger, Jung, Carter, & Anderson, 2005 for examples of how models can be used to address neuroimaging data).

Another important factor with biological models is the models’ ability to create crosstalk between different types of constraints. For example, adjusting the model to better fit neurophysiological data may alter the behavioral predictions generated by the model, and adjusting the model to fit both the neurophysiological data and the behavioral data may alter the overall capacity of the network for storing patterns. Even though there may be multiple, qualitatively different ways to explain these different types of findings in isolation, it seems unlikely that there will also be multiple different ways to explain all of these different types of findings taken together.

Finally, insofar as the brain systems involved in episodic memory also contribute to other forms of learning, it should be possible to use data from these other domains to constrain the episodic memory models discussed in this chapter. In particular, as mentioned in Section 2, the cortical network involved in familiarity discrimination also plays a key role in extracting the statistical structure of the environment, and thus should contribute strongly to semantic memory (see the chapter by Rogers in this volume), categorization (see the chapter by Kruschke in this volume), and forms of implicit learning (see the chapter by Cleeremans in this volume). Raaijmakers and Shiffrin (2002) discuss how it is possible to apply REM to implicit memory and semantic memory.
data. Also, several researchers have argued that the hippocampus plays a key role in training up semantic memory by playing back new information to cortex in an “off-line” fashion (e.g., during sleep); for models of this consolidation process see Alvarez and Squire (1994) and Meeter and Murre (in press).

Medial temporal lobe structures involved in episodic memory have also been implicated in simple incremental learning tasks that have been used in animals and humans (e.g., discrimination learning and conditioning). For discussion of ways in which the CLS model can be applied to discrimination learning and conditioning, see O’Reilly and Rudy (2001); see also Gluck, Meeter, and Myers (2003) and Meeter et al. (2005) for additional discussion of convergences between episodic memory, discrimination learning, and conditioning. Lastly, the hippocampus and surrounding cortical structures play a key role in spatial learning; for discussion of models that relate spatial learning and episodic memory, see Burgess, Becker, King, and O’Keefe (2001).

In summary: Episodic memory modeling has a long tradition of trying to build comprehensive models that can simultaneously account for multiple recall and recognition findings. So long as future modeling work carries on with this tradition, and modelers continue to apply all available constraints to theory development, we should continue to see steady progress toward a complete, mechanistic account of how the brain stores and retrieves episodic memories.

Appendix A: CLS Model Details

This appendix (adapted from Appendix A and Appendix B of Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) describes the computational details of the Norman and O’Reilly (2003) CLS model simulations. See Norman and O’Reilly (2003) for additional details and references.
Pseudocode

The pseudocode for the algorithm is given here, showing exactly how the pieces of the algorithm described in more detail in the subsequent sections fit together. The algorithm is identical to the Leabra algorithm described in O’Reilly and Munakata (2000; O’Reilly, 1998), except the error-driven-learning component of the Leabra algorithm was not used here.

Outer loop: Iterate over events (trials) within an epoch. For each event, let the pattern of network activity settle across multiple cycles (time steps) of updating:

1. At start of settling, for all units:

   (a) Initialize all state variables (activation, \( v_m \), etc).

   (b) Apply external patterns.

2. During each cycle of settling, for all non-clamped units:

   (a) Compute excitatory net input (\( g_e(t) \) or \( \eta_j \), Equation 18).

   (b) Compute k-Winners-Take-All inhibition for each layer, based on \( g_i^\Theta \) (Equation 21):

      i. Sort units into two groups based on \( g_i^\Theta \): top \( k \) and remaining \( k+1 \) to \( n \).

      ii. Set inhib conductance \( g_i \) between \( g_k^\Theta \) and \( g_{k+1}^\Theta \) (Equation 20).

   (c) Compute point-neuron activation combining excitatory input and inhibition (Equation 16).

3. Update the weights (based on linear current weight values), for all connections:

   (a) Compute Hebbian weight changes (Equation 22).

   (b) Increment the weights and apply contrast-enhancement (Equation 24).
Point Neuron Activation Function

Leabra uses a point neuron activation function that models the electrophysiological properties of real neurons, while simplifying their geometry to a single point.

The membrane potential $V_m$ is updated as a function of ionic conductances $g$ with reversal (driving) potentials $E$ as follows:

$$\frac{dV_m(t)}{dt} = \tau \sum_c g_c(t) \bar{g}_c(E_c - V_m(t))$$

(16)

with 3 channels ($c$) corresponding to: $e$ excitatory input; $l$ leak current; and $i$ inhibitory input. Following electrophysiological convention, the overall conductance is decomposed into a time-varying component $g_c(t)$ computed as a function of the dynamic state of the network, and a constant $\bar{g}_c$ that controls the relative influence of the different conductances. The equilibrium potential can be written in a simplified form by setting the excitatory driving potential ($E_e$) to 1 and the leak and inhibitory driving potentials ($E_l$ and $E_i$) of 0:

$$V_m^\infty = \frac{g_e \bar{g}_e}{g_e \bar{g}_e + g_l \bar{g}_l + g_i \bar{g}_i}$$

(17)

which shows that the neuron is computing a balance between excitation and the opposing forces of leak and inhibition.

The excitatory net input/conductance $g_e(t)$ or $\eta_j$ is computed as the proportion of open excitatory channels as a function of sending activations times the weight values:

$$\eta_j = g_e(t) = \langle x_i w_{ij} \rangle = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i x_i w_{ij}$$

(18)

The inhibitory conductance is computed via the k-Winners-Take-All function described in the next section, and leak is a constant.
Activation communicated to other cells \((y_j)\) is a thresholded \((\Theta)\) sigmoidal function of the membrane potential with gain parameter \(\gamma\):

\[
y_j(t) = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma|V_m(t) - \Theta|_+}
\]

where \([x]_+\) is a threshold function that returns 0 if \(x < 0\) and \(x\) if \(X > 0\). This sharply-thresholded function is convolved with a Gaussian noise kernel \((\sigma = .005)\), which reflects the intrinsic processing noise of biological neurons.

**k-Winners-Take-All Inhibition**

Leabra uses a \(k\)-Winners-Take-All (kWTA) function to achieve sparse distributed representations (c.f., Minai & Levy, 1994). A uniform level of inhibitory current for all units in the layer is computed as follows:

\[
g_i = g_{k+1}^\Theta + q(g_k^\Theta - g_{k+1}^\Theta)
\]

where \(0 < q < 1\) is a parameter for setting the inhibition between the upper bound of \(g_k^\Theta\) and the lower bound of \(g_{k+1}^\Theta\). These boundary inhibition values are computed as a function of the level of inhibition necessary to keep a unit right at threshold:

\[
g_i^\Theta = g_e^*g_e(E_e - \Theta) + g_l\bar{g}_l(E_l - \Theta)
\]

where \(g_e^*\) is the excitatory net input without the bias weight contribution — this allows the bias weights to override the kWTA constraint.

In the basic version of the kWTA function used here, \(g_k^\Theta\) and \(g_{k+1}^\Theta\) are set to the threshold inhibition value for the \(k\)th and \(k+1\)th most excited units, respectively. Thus, the inhibition is placed exactly to allow \(k\) units to be above threshold, and the remainder below threshold. For this version, the \(q\) parameter is set to .25, allowing the \(k\)th unit to be sufficiently above the inhibitory
threshold.

**Hebbian Learning**

The simplest form of Hebbian learning adjusts the weights in proportion to the product of the sending \(x_i\) and receiving \(y_j\) unit activations: \(\Delta w_{ij} = x_i y_j\). The weight vector is dominated by the principal eigenvector of the pairwise correlation matrix of the input, but it also grows without bound. Leabra uses essentially the same learning rule used in competitive learning or mixtures-of-Gaussians (Rumelhart & Zipser, 1986; Nowlan, 1990; Grossberg, 1976), which can be seen as a variant of the Oja normalization (Oja, 1982):

\[
\Delta_{\text{hebb}} w_{ij} = x_i y_j - y_j w_{ij} = y_j (x_i - w_{ij})
\] (22)

Rumelhart and Zipser (1986) and O’Reilly and Munakata (2000) showed that, when activations are interpreted as probabilities, this equation converges on the conditional probability that the sender is active given that the receiver is active.

To renormalize Hebbian learning for sparse input activations, Equation 22 can be re-written as follows:

\[
\Delta w_{ij} = \epsilon [y_j x_i (m - w_{ij}) + y_j (1 - x_i) (0 - w_{ij})]
\] (23)

where an \(m\) value of 1 gives Equation 22, while a larger value can ensure that the weight value between uncorrelated but sparsely active units is around .5. In these simulations, \(m = \frac{5}{\alpha_m}\) and \(\alpha_m = .5 - q_m (.5 - \alpha)\), where \(\alpha\) is the sending layer’s expected activation level, and \(q_m\) (called \(\text{savg\_cor}\) in the simulator) is the extent to which this sending layer’s average activation is fully corrected for \((q_m = 1\) gives full correction, and \(q_m = 0\) yields no correction).
Weight Contrast Enhancement

One limitation of the Hebbian learning algorithm is that the weights linearly reflect the strength of the conditional probability. This linearity can limit the network’s ability to focus on only the strongest correlations, while ignoring weaker ones. To remedy this limitation, a contrast enhancement function is used that magnifies the stronger weights and shrinks the smaller ones in a parametric, continuous fashion. This contrast enhancement is achieved by passing the linear weight values computed by the learning rule through a sigmoidal nonlinearity of the following form:

$$\hat{w}_{ij} = \frac{1}{1 + \left( \theta \frac{w_{ij}}{1-w_{ij}} \right)^{-\gamma}}$$

(24)

where $\hat{w}_{ij}$ is the contrast-enhanced weight value, and the sigmoidal function is parameterized by an offset $\theta$ and a gain $\gamma$ (standard default values of 1.25 and 6, respectively, are used here).

Cortical and Hippocampal Model Details

The cortical model is comprised of a 240-unit input layer (with 10% activity) that projects (in a feedforward fashion) to a “perirhinal” layer with 10% activity. Each perirhinal unit receives connections from 25% of the input units. The number of units in the perirhinal layer was set to 1,920 in some simulations and 240 in other simulations.

Regarding the hippocampal model: Table 1 shows the sizes of different hippocampal subregions and their activity levels in the model. These activity levels are enforced by setting appropriate $k$ parameters in the Leabra kWTA inhibition function. As discussed in the main text, activity is much

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Activity (pct)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA3</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA1</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Sizes of different subregions and their activity levels in the model.
Table 2: Properties of modifiable projections in the hippocampal model: Mean initial weight strength, variance of the initial weight distribution, scaling of this projection relative to other projections, and percent connectivity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projection</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Var</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>% Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC to DG, CA3 (perforant path)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG to CA3 (mossy fiber)</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA3 recurrent</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA3 to CA1 (Schaffer)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the properties of the four modifiable projections in the hippocampal model. For each simulated participant, connection weights in these projections are set to values randomly sampled from a uniform distribution with mean and variance (range) as specified in the table. The “scale” factor listed in the table shows how influential this projection is, relative to other projections coming into the layer, and “percent connectivity” specifies the percentage of units in the sending layer that are connected to each unit in the receiving layer. Relative to the perforant path, the mossy fiber pathway is sparse (i.e., each CA3 neuron receives a much smaller number of mossy fiber synapses than perforant path synapses) and strong (i.e., a given mossy fiber synapse has a much larger impact on CA3 unit activation than a given perforant path synapse). The CA3 recurrents and the Schaffer collaterals projecting from CA3 to CA1 are relatively diffuse, so that each CA3 neuron and each CA1 neuron receive a large number of inputs sampled from the entire CA3 population.

The connections linking EC_in to CA1, and from CA1 to EC_out, are not modified in the course of the simulated memory experiment. Rather, these connections are pre-trained to form an invertible mapping, whereby the CA1 representation resulting from a given EC_in pattern is capable of re-creating that same pattern on EC_out. CA1 is arranged into eight columns (consisting of 80 units apiece); each column receives input from three slots in EC_in and projects back to the cor-
Computational models of episodic memory

responding three slots in EC_out. See O’Reilly and Rudy (2001) for discussion of why CA1 is structured in columns.

Lastly, the model incorporates the claim, set forth by Michael Hasselmo and his colleagues, that the hippocampus has two functional “modes”: an encoding mode, where CA1 activity is primarily driven by EC_in, and a retrieval mode, where CA1 activity is primarily driven by stored memory traces in CA3 (e.g., Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997). To instantiate this hypothesis, the scaling factor for the EC_in to CA1 projection was set to a large value (6) at study, and the scaling factor was set to zero at test.

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